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 1 INTRODUCTION 
Hungary has all the major elements of a potentially successful national innovation system 
(NIS): a fully fledged education system; internationally recognised research units both at 
universities and the institutes of the Academy of Sciences; an increasing number of business 
R&D units, several of them operated by multinational firms and thus integrated into 
international networks; a number of government bodies engaged in science, technology and 
innovation (STI) policy-making and a considerable number of policy schemes in place; 
various types of professional associations and chambers; a functioning capital market, 
complete with venture capital funds; rules on intellectual property rights up to international 
standards; legislation compatible with the requirements of a market economy based on private 
property; apparently creative people; etc. Yet, innovation indicators suggest a poor 
performance in international comparison.  
Two major reasons can be thought of when discussing this apparent contradiction. First, 
although these ‘nodes’ of the NIS are set up, a number of them do not work satisfactorily, or 
still fledgling. Second, as innovation studies stress, the major factor determining the overall 
innovation performance is not the performance of the individual organisations, but the 
intensity and quality of linkages and co-operation among them. (Fagerberg et al. (eds) [2005]; 
Lundvall et al. [2002]; Niosi [2002]) 
This paper cannot analyse in detail the major characteristics and operation of the principal 
players of the Hungarian NIS, and thus cannot tackle the first hypothetical explanation.1 
Rather, it is focussing on just one element of this broad picture: the innovation activities of 
Hungarian firms. Nevertheless, firms are supposed to be the engines of an innovation system 
in a market economy context, and hence this issue merits a close attention. 
The Micro-Dyn project is applying various analytical approaches and tools when analysing 
firms’ innovation activities from different angles (e.g. innovation strategies, market dynamics, 
competitiveness, regional and labour issues, internationalisation). This paper reports on the 
findings of interviews conducted with Hungarian firms, i.e. it mainly relies on qualitative 
analysis. At a later stage, an attempt might be made to find an overarching analytical 
framework under which these results can be juxtaposed with those stemming from 
quantitative methods – utilising a much larger sample –, especially when drawing broad 
theoretical conclusions and identifying policy implications. 
In more details, interviews have been conducted on firms’ overall business and innovation 
strategies and innovation activities to pursue three interconnected aims: 
 better understand firm behaviour by analysing qualitative features of innovation 
processes (motivations, dynamics, linkages among driving factors and collaboration 
among actors); 
 identify and sharpen hypotheses and research questions for quantitative analyses; 
 derive policy implications. 
The paper is organised as follows. To set the scene, a brief overview of the Hungarian NIS 
is offered in Section 2, and the major performance indicators are presented in international 
comparison in Section 3. Then the sample is described and the major interview findings are 
summarised in Section 4. The concluding section highlights implications for innovation 
surveys’ methods, further quantitative analyses, as well as innovation policies and policy 
analyses. 
                                               
1 For a recent, detailed discussion on the major players of the Hungarian NIS, see, e.g. Havas and Nyiri (eds) 
[2007] and OECD [2008]. 
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2 THE HUNGARIAN NIS: AN OVERVIEW 
Given the main research questions of the Micro-Dyn project, this paper is focussing on the 
R&D and innovation activities of firms, but it also describes the STI decision-making bodies, 
the organisations implementing STI policies, and provides a brief a characterisation of two 
other research performing sectors: universities and R&D institutes.2 The weight of non-profit 
research organisations, just as in most OECD countries, is rather small in Hungary: their share 
in performing R&D activities, measured in utilising the gross expenditures on R&D (GERD), 
is below 1%. This sector, therefore, is not discussed below. 
Figure 1 highlights the different players of the Hungarian NIS – although not all elements 
will be discussed in this paper. 
 
Figure 1: The Hungarian NIS as of February 2010 
Source: Compiled by the author 
2.1 The STI policy governance system 
The Education and Science Committee, together with the Economic and Informatics 
Committee of the Parliament are the highest-level political bodies in the field of STI policy. 
Recognising the cross-sectoral nature of STI policies, a sub-committee of the Education and 
                                               
2 In the Hungarian statistical nomenclature the “government sector” – as it is defined by the OECD – is called 
„R&D institutes and other research units”; i.e. these two terms are equivalent. The second part of the Hungarian 
term, namely “other research units” refers to R&D units operated at/by national and regional archives, libraries, 
museums, hospitals and ministries. In brief, the following three notions should be understood as synonyms in 
this report: the government sector; R&D institutes and other research units; (publicly financed) R&D institutes. 
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Science Committee of the Parliament, called Science and Innovation Policy ad hoc 
Committee, was established in August 2007. 
The Science and Technology Policy Council (TTPK) had been the highest-level 
government body – headed by the prime minister – charged with the task co-ordinate STI 
policy decisions for several years. It was abolished in March 2009, and then re-established in 
September 2009 by the new government – taking office in April 2009 – under a new name, 
Research and Science Policy Council, and with somewhat revised responsibilities. It held its 
first meeting on 17 February 2010, chaired by the prime minister.3 
A new position of Minister without portfolio was created in May 2008 to co-ordinate and 
oversee STI policies, and to supervise the National Office of Research and Technology, the 
government agency responsible for implementing national technology and innovation 
policies, most notably the operation of the schemes financed by the Research and 
Technological Innovation Fund. In these matters, strategic decisions are taken by the 
Research and Technological Innovation Council (KuTIT). However, in April 2009 this 
position was abolished when a new government was formed, and the Minister for National 
Development and Economy took over the responsibilities of the Minister without portfolio. 
The Ministry of Education and Culture (OKM) plays a key role in the formation and 
implementation of science and education policies. It supervises the state education system 
from elementary schools to universities, except the defence and police education institutes, 
thus it has full responsibility in providing human resources for the economy. The Higher 
Education and Research Council (FTT) is an advisory body, which assists the Minister in 
tasks and decisions related to higher education and academic research. 
The Hungarian Academy of Sciences (MTA) is a legal entity, a public body having self-
governing rights. In brief, its main tasks are to develop, promote and represent science. 
Although it could also be regarded as one of the most important research performers (through 
its network of research institutes, see below), its role in priority-setting in the field of science 
policy cannot be neglected, either. Most notably, the MTA has significantly influenced the 
government's mid-term STI policy strategy (2007-2013). Furthermore, the President of the 
MTA, through various bodies and mechanisms, plays an active role in STI policy-making. 
The Regional Development Councils play a minor role in setting STI policies at a regional 
level. 
The National Office for Research and Technology (NORT; or NKTH) is responsible for 
the government’s technology and innovation policy, devises R&D and innovation support 
schemes, etc. These schemes are financed by the Research and Technological Innovation 
Fund. Funds allocated through the Operational Programmes of the New Hungary 
Development Plan (2007-13) are managed by the National Development Agency (NDA or 
NFÜ). Both the NKTH and NFÜ schemes are administered by an implementing or 
intermediary organisation, called the Hungarian Economy Development Centre (MAG Zrt.). 
 
2.2 Research performers 
This sub-section is introducing the major research performers, indicating their weight in the 
Hungarian research system. Innovation activities are discussed in Section3. 
 
                                               
3 Most likely a new government will take office after the general elections due in April 2010. Given the 
organisational instability of the STI policy-making system observed in the last 20 years, it is uncertain if the 
Research and Science Policy Council would continue its operation. 
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2.2.1 Research organisations and research staff 
The number of R&D organisations has nearly doubled since 1995, due to a significant 
expansion in the higher education (HE) sector, especially up to 2004, but more recently given 
the boost in the business sector: from 226 R&D units in 1995 to 1,471 units in 2008. The 
largest number of research units is still operated in the HE sector, in spite of the declining 
trend since 2005: 1,552 of the total 2,821 in 2008. (Table 1) 
Table 1: The number of R&D units by research performing sector, 1995-2008 
 1995 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
R&D institutes 107 121 143 168 175 201 208 219 195 
Higher Education 1,109 1,421 1,613 1,628 1,697 1,566 1,552 1,496 1,471 
Business enterprises 226 478 670 674 669 749 1,027 1,125 1,155 
Total 1,442 2,020 2,426 2,470 2,541 2,516 2,787 2,840 2,821 
Source: KSH, Research and Development 
The business sector became the largest employer of researchers (full-time equivalent, FTE) 
in 2006, with a share of 35.6%, and then reaching 42.8% in 2008. It is followed by the higher 
education sector (HE) with 31.7% in 2008 (down from around 40% in 2000-2004) and the 
government sector with a weight of 25.5% (down from around 40% in the second half of the 
1990s). (Tables 2-3) 
Table 2: Employment of (FTE) researchers by research performing sector, 1995-2008 
 1995 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
R&D institutes 3,905 4,653 4,622 4,741 4,693 4,959 5,226 4,572 4,720 
Higher education 4,044 5,852 5,999 5,957 5,902 5,911 6,073 5,833 5,872 
Business enterprises 2,550 3,901 4,344 4,482 4,309 5,008 6,248 6,986 7,912 
Total 10,499 14,406 14,965 15,180 14,904 15,878 17,547 17,391 18,504 
Source: KSH, Research and Development 
Table 3: Share of (FTE) employment by research performing sector, 1995-2008 (%) 
 1995 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
R&D institutes 37.2 32.3 30.9 31.2 31.5 31.2 29.8 26.3 25.5 
Higher education 38.5 40.6 40.1 39.2 39.6 37.2 34.6 33.5 31.7 
Business enterprises 24.3 27.1 29.0 29.5 28.9 31.6 35.6 40.2 42.8 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: author’s calculations based on KSH data 
 
2.2.2 R&D spending 
The business sector used the largest amount of funds on R&D already in 1995, followed by 
the government sector and higher education, and this ranking has not changed since then. The 
gap between firms and the other two research performing sectors, however, has widened 
significantly since 2004. The business sector spent more on R&D in 2007-2008 than the two 
other sectors combined. (The sources of R&D spending are discussed in Section 3. 
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Table 4: Distribution of GERD by research performers, 1995-2008 (m HUF, at current 
prices) 
 1995 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
R&D institutes 13,413 27,494 56,328 55,091 53,640 58,171 60,373 59,377 62,314 
Higher education 10,201 25,310 43,135 46,972 44,615 52,246 57,943 57,365 58,704 
Business enterprises 16,129 46,704 60,828 64,566 74,641 89,703 114,872 123,669 140,042 
Source: KSH, Research and Development 
 
3 HUNGARY’S R&D AND INNOVATION PERFORMANCE 
Hungary’s performance in R&D and innovation (RTDI) is presented in this section, covering 
the three major RTDI performing sectors, in comparative perspective. First a broad brush 
international comparison is offered, and then a more detailed analysis is provided, based on 
standard input and output indicators, that is, R&D expenditures and personnel, publications 
and citations, patenting, industrial design and trademarks, and innovation performance of 
businesses. 
At a first glance, Hungarian RTDI activities lag considerably behind the OECD average by 
most indicators. First, the overall level of R&D activities is still way below the OECD 
average. Second, R&D activities of businesses are significantly lower than the OECD 
average. From a different angle, the government and higher education sectors account for a 
much higher share of R&D activities. (Table 5) 
 6 
Table 5: Main comparable RTDI indicators of Hungary and the OECD, 1995-2007 
    1995 2000 2002 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Total 
Hungary 0.71 0.8 1.00 0.88 0.94 1.00 0.97 GERD as a percentage of GDP 
OECD 2.07 2.23 2.23 2.19 2.23 2.26 2.29 
Hungary 64.8 96.2 147.1 142.3 160.2 180.4 181.3 GERD per capita population 
(current PPP $) OECD 403.4 534.5 573.6 615.1 657.2 705.7 747.6 
Hungary 2.9 3.5 3.6 3.9 3.8 4.1 4.5 Total researchers per thousand 
total employment OECD 5.9 6.3 6.6 7.2 7.2 7.3 7.4 
Business 
Hungary 0.31 0.35 0.35 0.36 0.41 0.48 0.49 BERD as a percentage of 
GDP OECD 1.37 1.56 1.51 1.48 1.51 1.56 1.59 
Hungary 38.4 37.8 29.7 37.1 39.4 43.3 43.9 Percentage of GERD financed 
by industry OECD 59.5 64.4 62.4 62.1 62.1 62.8 63.8 
Hungary 43.4 44.3 35.5 41.1 43.2 48.3 50.3 Percentage of GERD 
performed by businesses OECD 66.8 69.7 67.7 67.6 68.0 69.0 69.6 
Hungary 78.3 75.8 69.3 77.4 77.8 75.6 74.9 Percentage of BERD financed 
by industry OECD 85.9 89.2 89.6 89.4 89.6 89.8 90.1 
Hungary 27.9 27.1 29.0 29.5 28.9 31.5 35.6 Researchers in business as a 
percentage of national total OECD 61.9 63.7 64.3 65.1 64.3 64.3 64.9 
Higher Education 
Hungary 0.18 0.19 0.25 0.22 0.24 0.24 0.23 HERD as a percentage of GDP 
OECD 0.33 0.38 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.38 
Hungary 24.8 24.0 25.2 24.6 25.1 24.4 23.3 Percentage of GERD 
performed by HEIs OECD 16.2 17.0 17.4 17.7 17.6 17.1 16.8 
Hungary 2.1 5.5 11.8 12.9 11.8 13.0 13.7 Percentage of HERD financed 
by industry OECD 6.2 6.2 6.2 6.1 6.2 6.3 .. 
Government 
Hungary 0.18 0.21 0.33 0.26 0.26 0.25 0.23 GOVERD as a percentage of 
GDP OECD 0.30 0.23 0.27 0.27 0.26 0.26 0.25 
Hungary 25.6 26.1 32.9 29.6 28.0 25.4 24.2 Percentage of GERD 
performed by the gov’t sector OECD 14.4 10.3 12.2 12.1 11.8 11.4 11.1 
Hungary 33.6 32.3 30.9 31.2 31.5 31.2 29.8 Government researchers as a 
percentage of national total OECD 9.7 8.1 7.6 7.4 7.4 7.4 7.3 
Source: OECD, Main Science and Technology Indicators 
 
3.1 Volume and composition of GERD 
Gross R&D expenditures (GERD) fluctuated between 0.7-0.8% of GDP until 2000, and 
between 0.9 and 1% since 2001. GERD, however, has grown significantly in absolute terms 
since 2004, and reached HUF 266.4 bn (~ EUR 1 bn). 
 7 
Table 6: Gross R&D expenditures (GERD) in Hungary, 1998-2008 (current prices) 
 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
GERD (bn HUF) 71.2 78.2 105.4 140.6 171.5 175.8 181.5 207.8 238.0 245.7 266.4 
GERD/GDP (%) 0.70 0.68 0.82 0.94 1.01 0.95 0.89 0.95 1.00 0.97 1.00 
GERD per capita (USD)* 72.2 76.4 96.2 125.6 147.1 145.1 142.3 160.2 180.4 181.3 .. 
Source: KSH, Research and development, GERD per capita: OECD, Main Science and Technology Indicators 
* Current prices, PPP 
As for the financial sources of GERD, the central budget has clearly played a dominant 
role in the 1990s. The share of businesses stagnated at around 38% in the late 1990s, followed 
by a temporary setback in 2001-2003. A considerable improvement has occurred since 2004, 
and hence this share reached in 48.3% in 2008. This is still a relatively modest figure, as the 
OECD average is well above 60% (64.5% in 2008). 
Table 7: Gross R&D expenditures (GERD) by financing sources, 1998-2008 (%) 
 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Business enterprises 37,7 38,5 37,8 34,8 29,7 30,7 37,1 39,4 43,3 43,9 48,3 
Government 49,6 53,2 49,5 53,6 58,5 58 51,8 49,4 44,8 44,4 41,8 
Other national source 2,8 2,7 2,1 2,4 1,4 0,6 0,7 0,5 0,6 0,6 0,6 
Funds from abroad 4,8 5,6 10,6 9,2 10,4 10,7 10,4 10,7 11,3 11,1 9,3 
Source: KSH, Research and development 
 
3.2 Publications 
The performance of Hungarian researchers compares favourably with the EU average, 
following a cost/benefit approach. The output per researcher is close to the EU15 average 
(85%), while funding is much lower: 40% of EU15 R&D spending per researcher and 47% 
funding per publications. The quality of publications – as suggested by the citation-related 
indicators – is also much closer to the EU average than the level of funding. (Figure 2) 
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Figure 2: Hungarian scientific performance by selected indicators, 2004* (EU15=100)** 
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Source: Eurostat for GERD and research personnel (FTE); Web of Science (Thomson Scientific) for 
publications and citations 
* Citation period: 2004-2006 
** Figure 2 follows the methodology and approach of Tolnai [2006] 
 
A recent study, relying on the Web of Science database, has analysed the performance of 
Hungarian researchers by scientific fields, using three indicators: the number of publications 
(output) in 2001-2005, the impact factors of journals for publications (publication strategy) 
and the citation rate (impact of publications). (Schubert [2007]) As this issue is beyond the 
scope of the Micro-Dyn project, results are not summarised here. 
 
3.3 R&D and innovation activities in the business sector 
The structure of the Hungarian economy has changed significantly since 1990. The number of 
firms increased sharply, especially that of the micro-enterprises. The density of companies is 
higher than the EU average, while their average size is smaller.4 
One of the most worrisome performance indicators of the Hungarian NIS is the low level 
of business expenditures on R&D in international comparison, measured either as a 
percentage of GDP or that of GERD. The Hungarian BERD/GDP ratio was a mere 44% of the 
EU27 average (0.49% vs 1.12%) in 2007, and 31% of the OECD average (1.59%). (OECD 
MSTI 2009/1) 
Business R&D expenditures have significantly increased since 1995, albeit from a low 
level, and an especially fast growth has occurred from 2004 on. (Table 8) Although BERD 
has doubled between 1995 and 2005 (in constant prices), the BERD/GDP ratio only grew by 
some 32%, given the dynamic economic growth recorded until the mid-2000s. 
                                               
4 In 2003 the number of enterprises per 1000 inhabitants was 61 in Hungary and 49 in the EU15, the average size 
of firms was 5 employees in Hungary, while 7 in the EU15. (KSH, 2006b) 
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Table 8: Business R&D expenditures (BERD) in Hungary, 1995-2007 
 1995 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
BERD (m USD*) 319.3 435 484 483.1 535.2 629.1 775.7 789.8 
BERD as percentage of GDP (%) 0.31 0.35 0.34 0.34 0.36 0.41 0.48 0.49 
BERD as percentage of GERD (%) 43.4 44.3 35.5 36.7 41.1 43.2 48.3 50.3 
Source: OECD, Main Science and Technology Indicators 
* constant prices (USD 2000), PPP 
The R&D activities of Hungarian firms are financed by three main sources. The most 
significant one is their own funds: 79.8% in 2008, that is slightly below the EU27 average of 
82.7% (2006). Funds from abroad accounted for 11.4% of the Hungarian BERD,5 well above 
the EU average (10.0% in 2006). Finally, the weight of public funds was 8.6% in 2008,6 that 
is, just above of the EU27 average (7.2% in 2006). (KSH, Research and Development; OECD 
MSTI 2009/1) 
As for the share of (FTE) researchers employed by businesses, Hungary lags considerably 
behind the EU27 and the OECD averages: 42.8% in 2008 (EU27: 49.0% in 2007; OECD: 
64.9% in 2006). As already mentioned, the number of R&D units operated by enterprises has 
grown significantly – albeit from a very low figure. (Table 1) Hence, the average size of these 
units (measured by the number of FTE researchers per unit) has dropped to 8.2 in 2000, and 
then to 6.9 in 2008. This value is above the national average (5.1 in 2008), but way below the 
figure for publicly financed R&D institutes, namely 24.2. 
The R&D expenditures of businesses are heavily skewed: large enterprises (i.e. those with 
at least 250 employees) accounted for the two-thirds of BERD in 2008, but their weight had 
been even higher, that is, 70 to 80 percent in 2000-2007. (Table 9) 
Table 9: Composition of BERD by size of firms, 2000-2008 (%) 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Micro-enterprises (0-9 employees) 3.0 3.1 5.3 5.2 3.3 3.7 5.1 7.1 8.5 
Small enterprises (10-49) 5.4 4.9 6.9 6.7 6.9 7.1 9.7 10.8 11.8 
Medium-sized enterprises (50-249) 21.3 22.4 12.2 9.6 7.9 8.6 12.3 10.8 12.8 
Large enterprises (250-   ) 70.3 69.6 75.6 78.5 81.9 80.4 72.4 70.9 66.2 
Unknown - - - - - 0.2 0.5 0.4 0.7 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: KSH, Research and Development 
With regard to the number of enterprises undertaking R&D activities, and the research 
personnel employed, the picture is more balanced, with micro and small enterprises having 
gained a larger share in recent years. (Tables 10-11) 
                                               
5 This ratio had been much higher in previous years: 22.4% at its peak in 2003, and still between 15-18% in 
2004-2007. Indeed, in international comparison that was an extremely high weight of foreign funds in financing 
BERD. 
6 Tax holidays for R&D, in line with international practice, are not included in this figure. 
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Table 10: The number of firms conducting R&D activities by size-categories, 2000-2008 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Micro-enterprises (0-9 employees) 161 281 301 280 274 308 443 479 488 
Small enterprises (10-49) 95 101 120 138 138 155 224 259 260 
Medium-sized enterprises (50-249) 101 115 121 124 130 137 181 201 209 
Large enterprises (250-   ) 121 133 128 132 127 131 143 147 146 
Unknown - - - - - 18 36 39 52 
Total 478 630 670 674 669 749 1,027 1,125 1,155 
Source: KSH, Research and Development 
 
Table 11: Distribution of business R&D activities by size of firms, 2000 and 2008 (%) 
 2000 2008 
 Number of 
research 
units 
R&D 
personnel 
(FTE) 
Of which: 
researchers 
R&D 
expend. 
Number 
of 
research 
units 
R&D 
personnel 
FTE 
Of which: 
researchers 
R&D 
expend. 
Micro 
enterprises (0-9) 33.7 7.1 8.1 3.1 42.3 13.7 14.1 8.5 
Small enterprises 
(10-49) 19.9 10.0 9.5 5.4 22.5 19.2 17.0 11.8 
Medium-sized 
enterprises (50-
249) 
21.1 27.7 28.0 21.2 18.1 20.7 21.3 12.8 
Large enterprises 
(250-   ) 25.3 55.2 54.4 70.3 12.6 45.4 46.5 66.2 
Unknown - - - - 4.5 1.0 1.1 0.7 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: KSH, Research and Development 
Innovation survey data also suggest that SMEs play a minor – and diminishing – role: the 
share of innovative firms among the large ones was 44.4% in 1999-2001, while this ratio was 
20.9% for small ones (with 10-49 employees). By 2004-2006, the former share has increased 
to 55.2%, and the latter dropped to 13.9%. 
Table 12: The share of innovative enterprises in Hungary broken down by economic 
sector and size-categories, 1999-2001, 2002-2004 and 2004-2006 (%) 
 1999-2001 2002-2004 2004-2006 
Small enterprises (10-49 employees) 20.9 16.9 13.9 
Medium-sized enterprises (50-249) 28.0 30.5 29.6 
Large enterprises (250-   ) 44.4 52.4 55.2 
Total 23.3 20.9 17.7 
Source: Eurostat, CIS data 
 
As large firms tend to be foreign-owned, businesses with majority or full foreign 
ownership spend disproportionately more on R&D than indigenous ones. Though the share of 
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business R&D units operated at foreign-owned businesses has remained below 15%, these 
firms accounted for 66-74% of BERD in 2003-2007, decreasing to 59.2% in 2008. 
Table 13: The number of business R&D units by ownership, 2003-2008 
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Majority domestic 496 452 496 679 797 799 
Majority foreign 45 47 44 59 62 57 
Foreign (100%) 45 56 62 77 84 92 
Majority state-owned 31 29 34 38 34 30 
Majority local government-owned 10 9 8 12 11 10 
Unknown, cannot be established  47 76 105 108 137 167 
Total 
Share of foreign-affiliated business 
R&D units 
674 
13.4% 
669 
15.4% 
749 
14.2% 
1,027 
13.2% 
1,125 
13.0% 
1,155 
12.9% 
Source: KSH, Research and Development 
 
Table 14: Distribution of BERD by ownership, 2003-2008 (bn HUF, at current price) 
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Majority domestic 12.4 15.1 19.1 28.1 34.2 42.7 
Majority foreign 15.9 27.1 32.7 44.7 34.5 38.0 
Foreign (100%) 27.0 28.0 32.9 35.3 47.9 45.0 
Majority state-owned 2.6 3.7 3.7 4.1 4.0 4.6 
Majority local government-owned 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.2 
Unknown, cannot be established  6.4 0.5 1.0 1.6 2.8 9.5 
Total 
Share of foreign-affiliated business 
R&D units 
64.6 
66.4% 
74.6 
73.9% 
89.7 
73.1% 
114.9 
69.7% 
123.7 
66.6% 
140.0 
59.2% 
Source: KSH, Research and Development 
 
Again, innovation data are in line with R&D figures: CIS3 results show that indigenous 
firms innovate to a much smaller extent (15.1%) than foreign (21.5%), and especially jointly 
owned ones (34.2%). The distribution of innovative firms by ownership is not available for 
either 2002-2004 or 2004-2006, but there is no reason to assume that this pattern has changed 
to a significant extent since 2001, that is, the year for which CIS3 data are available. 
Business R&D expenditures as well as innovation activities are concentrated to large, 
foreign owned companies in a limited number of sectors. The chemical industry (mainly 
related to pharmaceuticals) accounted for 60.4% of the total R&D spending by manufacturing 
companies in 2006, and still 49.6% in 2008. (KSH) In other words, 5-6 large companies 
account for 35-40% of total Hungarian BERD. Several sectors perform way above the 
national average in terms of the share of innovative firms: chemicals, due to pharmaceuticals 
firms (51.9% in 2002-2004; 47.5% in 2004-2006), financial service providers (47%, and 
39.5%, respectively), automotive (37.2%, and 37.3%), as well as electrical machinery and 
instruments (33.8% in 2002-2004). A significantly higher share of large firms is innovative in 
these sectors, too, than that of the small and medium-sized ones. 
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The above figures suggest that Hungary continues to suffer from a dual economy 
syndrome: it is composed of highly productive and technology-intensive firms (most of which 
are large and foreign-owned), and fragile, financially and technologically weak indigenous 
SMEs. 
 
3.4 Patenting, industrial design and trademarks  
Hungarian firms are far less active in filing applications for patents, industrial design and 
trademarks than their counterparts in advanced and EU27 countries. Indeed, Hungary shows 
the weakest relative performance in terms of intellectual property indicators in the European 
Innovation Scoreboard: a mere 5-20% of the EU average. The number of national patent 
applications has even decreased significantly since 2003. (Table 15) This sudden drop is due 
to the fact that Hungary joined the European Patent Convention on 1 January 2003, and thus 
foreign inventors have filed their applications with the European Patent Office. The number 
of domestic patent applications has been stagnating at around 700-800 in recent years. This 
low patenting intensity reflects the level of indigenous RTDI activities, and also suggests a 
low level of IPR awareness. 
Table 15: Patenting activities in Hungary, 2001-2008 
 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
National patent applications 5,451 5,906 4,810 2,657 1,275 924 791 772 
Number of granted patents 1,306 1,555 1,379 977 1,243 1,916 2,216 2,212 
Valid patents 10,927 10,784 10,385 9,525 9,224 9,338 10,306 11,462 
Of which validated national patents 10,927 10,784 10,385 9,513 9,125 8,408 .. .. 
European patents validated in Hungary - - - 12 99 930 .. .. 
Source: MSzH data 
However, at least two arguments should be recalled here as to why one should interpret 
these figures with a pinch of salt. First, when assessing the performance of NIS in general, 
one should bear in mind that a wide array of other means can be – and indeed, are – utilised 
by firms to protect intellectual property, many of which are not captured by measurable or 
readily available indicators. Moreover, propensity to patenting is highly varied across sectors, 
and hence the sectoral distribution of a national economy might heavily influence the 
intensity of patenting activities. Thus, a low level of patenting activities does not necessarily 
indicate a poor innovation performance.7 Second, concerning specifically a catching up 
economy and its NIS, at that stage of development it might not be a meaningful (or feasible) 
target at all to produce as many patentable R&D results as possible. It seems to be more 
relevant to concentrate on (a) fostering the diffusion of new technologies and other forms of 
innovation; and (b) enhancing the learning capabilities for more efficient absorption of new 
methods and technologies. 
 
3.5 Academia-industry co-operation in Hungary 
There could be a variety of linkages in successful national innovation system among its 
players (businesses, academia, intermediary and service providers, policy-makers at various 
levels). Firms are involved in different ways – formally and informally – and to a varying 
                                               
7 This, of course, is not to suggest that the Hungarian NIS performs fabulously, in spite of the picture shown in 
the mirror of patenting activities. 
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degree in devising STI policy strategies and actual policy measures. The links between 
businesses and intermediary organisations (including players offering funds for innovation 
activities) is also a crucial factor in determining the performance of a given NIS, just as 
external linkages, that is, the internationalisation of RTDI processes8 and STI policy 
formation. Of these linkages, only academia-industry co-operation is discussed in this paper. 
A wide variety of knowledge and skills are required for innovation processes to be 
successful, and these different types of inputs are distributed among various actors. Thus, 
their co-operation is vital. CIS data, however, reveal a low intensity of innovation co-
operation in Hungary. Several STI policy measures have been devised to tackle directly this 
challenge. Further measures, facilitating international co-operation are also of relevance, and 
co-operation is promoted by a number of other schemes, too, as a complementary objective. 
Several striking features can be identified by analysing R&D funding flows.9 The first one 
is the high share of funds from abroad, the bulk of which goes to business enterprises.10 
Second, business enterprises fund research activities both at HE institutes and in the 
government sector (R&D institutes) to a noteworthy extent. (Figure 3) 
Figure 3: Funding flows 
 
Source: Author’s compilation based on Eurostat data 
                                               
8 Several foreign firms have integrated their Hungarian partners into international production and innovation 
networks by diffusing their technological and organisational innovations, as well as by setting high standards in 
terms of performance and quality of products. Hence, certain ‘archipelagos’ of the Hungarian NIS are created/ 
strengthened this way. 
9 Similar types of data on funding innovation activities are not readily available. 
10 It should be stressed here that financial support provided by the EU Structural Funds is accounted for as part 
of the state budget, i.e. it becomes “national” funding in statistics. 
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A closer look at the sources of Hungarian R&D expenditures indicates improving co-
operation among the research actors. While only 4-5% of the total higher education 
expenditures on R&D (HERD) had been financed by firms in 2000-2001, this ratio jumped to 
11-15% in 2002-2008 (14.7% in 2008). This is much higher than the EU27 or the OECD 
average (6.3% in 2008; and 6.3% in 2006, respectively). The only OECD member country 
with a higher share is Turkey. This high ratio of business funding might be attributed to the 
low level of the Hungarian HERD in absolute terms (€177-233m a year in 2002-2008, current 
prices): a few projects commissioned by firms, amounting to relatively small funds by 
international standards, can lead to a high weight of business funding in HERD. 
The financial links between firms and publicly financed R&D institutes show a more 
varied picture in recent years: the share of firms in Government Intramural Expenditure on 
R&D (GOVERD) was 11-13% in 2000-2001, dropped by around 50% in 2002-2004, and then 
exceeded 10% again in 2005. Since 2006 this indicator has been in the range of 12.3-14.3%. 
These variations hint to a more general hypothesis: incentives provided by various policy 
tools are just one element of a bigger, more complex system influencing innovation behaviour 
of the major actors. 
The share of GOVERD financed by industry is higher in Hungary than either the OECD or 
the EU27 average (3.8% [2006]; and 8.7% [2008], respectively). Yet, it was below the NZ, 
Polish, Finnish, and Slovak data (in descending order) in 2007. Still, it is a good position in 
international comparison. The low volume of the Hungarian GOVERD (€213-248m a year in 
2002-2008, current prices), most likely, is an important factor in explaining this ranking. 
Community Innovation Survey data indicate that industry-academia co-operation is not 
particularly strong in Hungary. The frequency of innovative firms' co-operation with higher 
education organisations first declined significantly (from 21.6% in 1999-2001 to 14.6% in 
2002-2004), and then improved (17.5% in 2004-2006), but still below the 1999-2001 level. 
As for their co-operation with public labs, it is even less frequent. (Table 16) 
Table 16: Share of innovative enterprises indicating co-operation with specified partners 
(percentage of all innovative enterprises) 
 1999-2001 2002-2004 2004-2006 
Other enterprises within the enterprise group 5.1 9.6 7.5 
Suppliers of equipment, materials, components, or 
software 26.8 26.6 25.0 
Clients or customers 24.8 20.0 16.0 
Competitors or other enterprises in sector 10.9 14.2 12.6 
Consultants* 14.6 
Private R&D organisations 13.7 
13.9 15.2 
Higher education organisations 21.6 14.6 17.5 
Government or public research institutes 8.6 6.4 6.5 
Source: KSH 
* Co-operation with consultants and private R&D organisations has been merged since the 2002-2004 survey 
 
4 QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS OF INNOVATION ACTIVITIES: INTERVIEW FINDINGS 
4.1 Rationale and motivation to conduct qualitative analysis 
Qualitative analysis has been suggested to pursue the guiding principles of Micro-Dyn’s WP1 
to complement quantitative analysis. Just to recall, innovation is a crucial part of 
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competitiveness and job creation. Given that firms are the major actors in innovation 
processes, understanding how they innovate is important both for theoretical and policy 
analyses. As emphasised in the literature, strategies that firms rely upon to create, absorb and 
exploit knowledge in order to successfully innovate differ a lot across firms, sectors and 
countries, and getting a better understanding of this pattern as well as its causal underpinnings 
is central to the research agenda of Micro-Dyn. However, one of the main findings of 
innovation studies is that firms do not innovate in a vacuum but in close interaction with other 
players such as customers, suppliers, R&D institutes, etc. From a different angle, various 
types of knowledge, stemming from diverse sources, are sought by firms to underpin their 
innovation strategies. It also highlights the important point that innovation strategies cannot 
be analysed independently of the broader context that conditions the formation and results of 
such strategic action. 
Until recently, the analysis of the above issues has been hampered by two major factors: i) 
lack of readily available firm level data; ii) lack of sufficiently large number of comparable 
case studies. As for the first obstacle, with the gradually increasing scope and coverage of the 
Community Innovation Survey (CIS), several relevant variables can be analysed by 
processing CIS data. Mcro-Dyn is exploiting this rich database for various WPs. 
However, it is still important to combine those results with information from other sources, 
at the firm, sector and country levels, to arrive at a broader, more comprehensive picture. 
Thus qualitative analyses are needed to complement Micr-Dyn’s – already pioneering – 
quantitative analyses to overcome the second obstacle mentioned above. To that end, it is 
crucial to conduct a sufficient number of interviews and case studies to reflect the diversity of 
firms, as well as the impacts of various factors affecting firms’ strategies. It is also of 
paramount importance to align qualitative and quantitative analyses, i.e. to have an 
appropriate research design. 
The qualitative analyses being performed for the Micro-Dyn project have rested upon the 
following postulations: 
A) The characteristics of national, regional, and sectoral innovation systems play a 
decisive role in the success of innovation processes, and these qualitative elements thus 
play a role in determining firms’ strategies and their success. 
B) Depending on a given firm (its actual strategy, size, sector, ownership, etc.), the 
“weight” of the national/ regional/ sectoral innovation system might be rather different. 
C) Besides the players mentioned above, STI policies (various schemes to promote R&D 
and innovation, e.g. taxation, grants, information and partnering/ networking services, 
etc.), regulation on IPR and other relevant issues; education, regional development, 
competition, investment promotion, trade and other polices; access to capital, the 
education system, professional associations, chambers are also important elements of 
an innovation system. 
D) The most important feature of a given innovation system, however, is the way in which 
the respective players communicate, co-operate and compete. 
The impact of these factors on firms’ strategies and their implementation cannot be 
analysed by CIS data alone. Different types of qualitative analyses (literature surveys on 
innovation systems in the countries to be analysed; interviews with key players, case studies 
on different types of firms) are needed to complement the quantitative analyses performed in 
the framework of the Micro-Dyn project. 
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4.2 Methodology and the sample 
Desk research has been conducted to identify sectors and types of companies which are 
particularly interesting to analyse the factors determining innovation capabilities and 
competitiveness. Building on these results, postulations listed above have been revisited, 
interview guidelines have been devised for interviews with firms. 
The interview guidelines have addressed three blocks of issues: 
 Background data on the firm 
 Innovation strategy 
o links with overall business strategy of the firm 
o decision-making competences at the interviewed firm 
o internal division of labour 
o main co-operation partners in RTDI activities 
o role and impacts of domestic and EU STI policies 
 Successful and abandoned innovations 
A fact sheet had been sent – having conducted the interview – to collect background data 
on the given firm. 
Seventeen interviews have been conducted at 14 firms and with policy-makers until 
February 2010, and a further 5-8 interviews are planned until June 2010. Companies have 
been selected to reflect diversity in terms of size, ownership, and R&D and innovation 
patterns of sectors (e.g. innovation activities of firms relying mainly on intra-mural or extra-
mural R&D activities; extra-mural but “intra-sectorial” R&D activities; “extra-sectorial” 
R&D activities and non-R&D types of knowledge). 
The firms interviewed so far are mainly foreign-owned, large enterprises, except 3 
domestic owned SMEs. Six of the foreign-owned firms have been established as greenfield 
sites, another one was formally a takeover of an existing firm, but in practice it can also be 
classified as a greenfield investment, while the remaining four foreign owned enterprises had 
taken over Hungarian firms. 
Reflecting the characteristics of the Hungarian innovation system and the relevance of 
sectors in terms of employment, contribution to GDP and exports, the following sectors are 
represented in the sample: 
 pharmaceuticals: 4 firms 
 automotive: 6 firms (one is a diversified one, active in other product markets, too) 
 information and communication technologies (ICT) and electronics: 4 firms. 
A more detailed statistical description of the sample will be prepared once all interviews 
are conducted. It should be stressed, however, that this work is not meant to be based on a 
statistically representative sample. 
4. 3 Main findings stemming from the interviews 
This version of the report highlights some key findings of the interviews. A more systematic 
analysis will follow when the remaining interviews are conducted. 
4.3.1 Diversity of innovation strategies and activities 
In line with the statistical evidence presented in Section 3, the interviews confirmed that size, 
ownership and sector matter. In general, small, domestic firms do not have the necessary 
skills and the required resources to devise innovation strategies, and face business and 
technological uncertainties in a conscious way. Yet, they are also engaged in innovation 
activities to improve their performance in order to stay in business or to cease new market 
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opportunities. They are seldom involved in formal(ised) R&D activities or radical 
innovations; rather they implement incremental innovations to meet new technical 
specifications. Often these modified products are designed by the buyers – in case of a 
sophisticated value chain it might be another player in the chain, not necessarily the ‘direct’ 
buyer – and the Hungarian supplier adjust its machinery and production processes to be able 
to manufacture the new product in question. These modifications might not even be regarded 
innovations by the interviewees because these are not based on advanced R&D activities, 
leading to radically new technological solutions. 
Size can ‘overrule’ behavioural patterns determined by ownership: a small firm with 20-30 
employees, taken over by a geographically distant parent firm is likely to conduct similar type 
of RTDI activities as an indigenous one. 
A small firm in the sample had been faced by a new demand from a customer to clean more 
thoroughly the processed parts following the usual oil treatment. It was not possible by the 
available machinery, therefore either a new technology (i.e. high-pressure washing 
technologies), or new detergents were needed to comply with the customer’s requirements. 
Following a thorough survey of potential solutions available on the market (e.g. offers from 
large chemicals firms), none of them proved financially feasible. The only viable solution was 
to modify the existing machinery by applying ideas developed in-house – but also approved by 
the customer. A typical domestic-owned firm would have behaved in the same way. In this case, 
however, even this technologically minor, and relatively inexpensive adjustment required the 
approval of the parent firm for quality assurance. 
These process innovations might require organisational and/or managerial innovations, too, 
especially in the case of medium-sized firms, where procedures need to be more formalised 
and the organisational set-up more structured (less flexible) than in the case of small firms 
with 10-20 employees. 
A medium-sized firm in the sample – actually, in 2008, when the devastating impacts of the 
global crisis was felt only for a few months, it was on the brink to become a large firm – has 
recently introduced a management information software package (SAP), but some middle 
managers still prefer using sheets of papers for calculations and keeping records. Thus training 
is still needed to foster cultural changes. Organisational changes are also being prepared to 
clearly delineate decision-making competences and responsibilities. A consultancy service is 
providing professional assistance in bringing about these changes. 
Hungarian subsidiaries of foreign firms tend to be at least medium-sized, but more often 
large enterprises. They usually organise their RTDI activities in the frame set by the overall 
business and innovation strategies of the parent firm, which, in turn, are defined by the 
sectoral patterns to a large extent. These are presented in this sub-section, while a tentative 
taxonomy of the role of RTDI activities (conducted in Hungary) in the overall business 
strategy of foreign-owned firms is discussed in the following one. 
The intensity and sources of innovation activities differs markedly across sectors. The 
major features of three sectoral innovation and production systems are described below. In 
this respect, interviews have not uncovered striking differences between the findings of 
widely accepted sectoral studies and the behaviour of the interviewed firms, but some 
interesting new elements have been found. It is not possible to establish if these additional 
insights are due to some unique Hungarian features or simply had been overlooked by 
previous sectoral studies, which cannot go as deep as firm-level interviews. 
Automotive industry 
Japanese automotive firms, notably Toyota, had developed a brand new production paradigm, 
called lean production or Toyota system, and have taken the lead in several aspects by the 
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1970s. One of the most important innovations of lean production is the novel way to arrange 
and manage the assembler-supplier relationships. Unlike in Fordist mass production, lean 
production is based on trust and the realisation of the importance of co-operative efforts. A 
wide range of information, therefore, is regularly exchanged among assemblers and suppliers 
so as to improve efficiency by joint efforts. Different forms of financial, managerial and 
technological assistance are also provided by the assembler. Borrowing analogies from game 
theory, suppliers and assemblers are engaged in a zero-sum game in Fordist mass production, 
while in lean production both of them are interested in, and working for, enlarging the `cake', 
i.e. increasing profits to be distributed among them. 
Another distinctive feature of the lean supply chain is its pyramid-like structure. In its 
original Japanese version, first-tier (T1) suppliers are tied to an assembler through ownership, 
usually with a minority stake, interlocking cross share-holdings and personnel links. Their 
tasks include not only manufacturing of certain parts and components but product design as 
well, either together with their assemblers or on their own.11 As for manufacturing of a given 
part, though, not just a single supplier can be chosen, and hence competition for orders could 
be maintained.12 Supply quota and target price, based on thorough, jointly conducted cost 
calculations and full exchange of all the relevant production and market information, are set in 
advance in multi-year contracts. Constant cost-cutting is not only anticipated, given learning 
effects, but deliberately planned; moreover, even fixed in the supply contract. Extra savings, 
stemming from further improvements achieved by suppliers, however, can be retained as 
profits, and thus incentives for additional cost-reducing innovations are built in into the 
system. 
First-tier suppliers have also built their network, usually consisting of 20-60 firms. These 
second-tier (T2) suppliers, in turn, rely on thousands of small and medium-sized enterprises, 
producing basically simple, and labour-intensive products given their wage advantages 
compared to larger firms. Suppliers’ performance is regularly evaluated using multiple criteria 
such as quality, design, delivery and price. Supply quotas, and thus profits, are awarded 
among suppliers according to the result of these evaluations. 
As for the links among the players, there are two major features of this pyramid structure. 
An actor at the upper level offers technical and managerial assistance to introduce various 
types of innovations, and also conducts thoroughly audits on every single important aspects of 
the overall production process: purchasing inputs and equipment, logistics inside and outside 
a given plant, technologies and processes, quality assurance, management, marketing and 
finance methods. 
The lean supply system displays a number of strategic strengths over mass production. 
First, it combines the co-ordination benefits usually associated with vertical integration with 
cost and efficiency discipline of markets. Second, and presumably more importantly, it 
facilitates both generation and fast diffusion of product, process and organisational 
innovations since there are no built-in conflicts between car producers and suppliers. It is 
hardly possible to exaggerate the importance of this advantage as the very nature of 
competition has undergone a major change: the former inter-firm competition has become a 
competition among networks of car producers and their suppliers. (Bongardt [1992]) 
                                               
11 In the latter case they might well work with other firms and various R&D institutes, of course. The point is, 
that the assembler only defines the main parameters of a given part or component, e.g. its size and required 
technical performance, and leaves the whole design process to its T1 supplier. 
12 Different authors provide diverse, somewhat contradictory accounts on the distribution of orders. Some of 
them emphasise single-sourcing, while others stress the importance of competition among suppliers. Compare, 
e.g. Bongardt [1992], Lamming [1993], Richardson [1993], Way, Schulte [1993] and Womack et al. [1991]. 
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Former Fordist mass producers have also changed their way of operation: introduced just-
in-time and total quality management, as well as ‘re-designed’ their product design process. 
They also give longer term contracts to fewer direct suppliers, exchange production and sales 
information with the most important ones in a joint effort to reduce costs, and hence increase 
efficiency, and involve them into R&D projects, too. 
It is practically impossible to delineate the boundaries of automotive industry and give an 
indication of its economic significance using readily available statistics. As a very wide range 
of products are used to assemble a motor vehicle – practically all industrial sectors supply the 
automotive industry –, data collected by statistical offices are usually too narrow in terms of 
coverage. In other words, quite a few automotive suppliers are classified as leather, rubber, 
plastics, paint, glass, cable or metal producing and processing companies, foundries, electrical 
and electronics companies, etc. The EU statistical classification also follows this line, i.e. 
motor vehicle parts and accessories (the “old” NACE 34.3013) excludes engine and tyre 
manufacturers, most of the electrical and electronic components, as well glass, plastic or 
certain castings and other metal parts. The Hungarian statistical system follows this practice, 
and thus figures only cover companies classified statistically as automotive firms. Relying on 
these types of data, ‘narrowly defined’ automotive industry (proxied as vehicle 
manufacturing, DM) has a significant weight in Hungary: its share in industrial production 
has increased from 12.2% in 2000 to 17.3% by 2007, i.e. moved from the 3rd to the 2nd place 
among sectors. Its revenues are earned overwhelmingly from exports: 90-91% in 2001-2008. 
Thus its share in manufacturing exports has exceed 25% by 2006-2008 (up from 22-23% in 
2001-2005). The industry has a noteworthy 11.5% slice in BERD, and as already mentioned, 
the share of innovative automotive firms is higher than that of manufacturing firms on 
average. (KSH) Hence, there has been a strong case to include 6 automotive firms – of which 
2 are serving non-automotive clients, too – in the sample so far. 
As for ownership, only one of them is an indigenous, middle-sized firm; two are large, 
green-field investments, another two are large, brown-field investments, and the remaining 
small one has also been taken over by a foreign company. Two of the foreign investors are 
non-EU companies. All these automotive firms are suppliers, and are integrated into lean 
production systems, with the major characteristics described above. Three of them are 
subsidiaries of T1 suppliers, and they can be classified into three different groups in terms of 
their activities. One is a T1 supplier ‘proper’, operating a sizeable R&D centre in Hungary. 
The second one exhibits a mixture of T1and T2 activities: it possesses so-called global 
responsibilities for those products, which are exclusively produced in Hungary for the entire 
group, while for the other products it is more acting as aT2 firm. The third one is mainly 
introducing new products developed by its parent firm, and engaged in process, managerial 
and organisational innovations, that is, its behaviour resembles a T2 supplier. The remaining 3 
firms are ‘pure’ T2 suppliers. 
As mentioned above, new products are usually brought in by parent firms. However, there are 
different types of exceptions to this rule. The obvious one is when formalised R&D activities 
are conducted in Hungary, leading to product innovations. In one such case a new product had 
been designed and tested in Hungary but then the Engineering Centre was relocated from 
Hungary – given broader strategic changes, re-allocating responsibilities among plants for the 
so-called OEM and aftermarket –, and hence this new product was also assigned to a different 
plant inside the group (outside Europe). Another source of product innovations is reverse 
engineering, e.g. in the case of spare parts sold on the aftermarket. Incremental innovations are 
also important from an economic point of view, although these are less spectacular. In these 
                                               
13 NACE codes were revised in 2008, but as most recent data available at a 4-digit level are from 2007, the “old” 
NACE codes are used in this report. 
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cases the idea might come either from the users, requesting improved performance or from the 
engineers of a supplier to reduce production costs, energy consumption and environmental 
burden (e.g. oil used during machining processes) or enhance product characteristics, e.g. by 
splicing thin metal sheets together instead of welding them. For this latter modification, the 
entire production process had to be redesigned, purchasing new equipment, introducing new 
measurement and test methods, too. 
In general, production processes are designed by the Hungarian subsidiary, assisted to some 
extent by the parent firm or the suppliers of machinery. In most cases, subsequent process 
innovations are stemming from local knowledge and experience. Also, it is quite often the case 
that products brought in by the parent firms need to be modified for more efficient 
manufacturing, i.e. the sources of these minor product innovations are the Hungarian 
subsidiaries. A frequent form of process innovation nowadays is the introduction of 
manufacturing cells, usually designed by the local engineers, trained by the parent firm, and 
assisted by general principles applied across the various subsidiaries of the group. 
As for organisational innovations, again, there might be some assistance provided by the parent 
firms in the form of internal manuals, guidelines and good practices, but local solutions are also 
encouraged. For example, so-called cross-functional teams have been introduced by an 
interviewed firm, composed of middle-managers responsible for purchasing, manufacturing, 
logistics, and quality assurance. These teams are usually co-ordinated by a sales manager, who 
is representing the firm vis-à-vis the client in all matters, responsible for obtaining and keeping 
orders, maintaining smooth co-operation with the buyer and inside the firms among the various 
units, and thus a profitable operation. For indigenous firms, the main sources of organisational 
innovations are their own ideas and/or external advisors (see above). 
Marketing innovations might be of economic relevance, too, especially for suppliers 
specialising in the aftermarket. One such firm in our sample has established direct contacts with 
its major buyers (e.g. public transport providers), and thus replaced wholesale companies. 
In sum, automotive firms are in fierce competition with their counterparts (assemblers – 
assemblers; T1 – T1 suppliers; etc.), and thus there are strong incentives to be innovative, i.e. 
to introduce new products, processes, organisational solutions, management and marketing 
methods. Moreover, several T1 suppliers, when assess their T2 suppliers’ performance 
include the intensity of innovativeness among the set of evaluation criteria. Our interviews 
have confirmed the crucial importance of co-operation among subsidiaries of large MNCs, 
and that of international production networks (in case of independent suppliers). Besides, 
local knowledge and experience are also important sources of the various types of innovations 
(technological and non-technological) observed. From a different angle, beyond formalised 
R&D activities, many other types of knowledge are needed to underpin successful 
innovations. 
Pharmaceuticals 
Pharmaceuticals industry is ‘the’ archetype of a science-based industry: it has the highest 
level of R&D intensity worldwide (16.1% of revenues was spent on R&D in 2007, and 16.5% 
in 2008), and is also spending the largest amount on R&D (19.2% and 18.9% of the global 
R&D expenditures accounted for in 2007 and 2008, respectively). (IRIS [2008], IRIS [2009]) 
Further, patents are the most important tools to protect intellectual property rights in this 
industry, and thus there are long time series on patents in many different countries. Given 
these two factors, pharmaceuticals is among the most intensively studied sectors, both in 
advanced and developing countries. There are highly specific features of R&D and innovation 
processes, as well as competition dynamics in this industry – e.g. the nature of search 
procedures in different technological regimes, lack of cumulativeness in search and 
development processes, fragmented markets (in terms of therapeutic categories), the role of 
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health authorities, doctors and insurance ‘regimes’ in shaping markets (by regulating it, 
registering, prescribing and financing drugs, the role of R&D subsidies and IPR systems – but 
these are not discussed here in any detail because none of them are specific to Hungary.14 Only 
those features are mentioned below, which are essential to summarise the interview findings. 
There are two major types R&D and innovation strategies in this sector: (i) developing 
original drugs; and (ii) producing so-called generics (replica of drugs not protected by patents 
any more). Pharmaceuticals companies have relied on their in-house R&D units for new 
molecules (candidates for drugs) and on external sources of knowledge to a varying extent in 
different periods, and also depending on their strategies. With the advent of biotechnology, 
universities, government laboratories, and small biotech firms – often span off from the 
former ones – are becoming more important partners in searching for new drugs. Moreover, 
the latter partners have also become targets for acquisitions by long-established large 
pharmaceuticals firms. 
The funds required for the development and marketing of a new, original drug has 
increased drastically over the last decades due to ever more complex clinical testing 
regulations. While the development of an original pharmaceutical product had cost around 
€149 m in 1975, its costs increased to €868 m euro by 2000. (AIPM [2006]) Prevailing 
regulations and requirements in the pharmaceuticals industry, such as the documentation of 
patent applications, tests required for the registration of new drugs and the qualification of the 
production technologies significantly increase the costs associated with research and 
development. For this reason large firms have become the dominant actors in the 
pharmaceuticals industry. 
As already stressed, pharmaceuticals firms spend by far the largest amount on R&D, and it 
is the most R&D-intensive industry in Hungary, too. The decisive factor to determine R&D 
and innovation activities is the strategy of multinational firms as foreign professional 
investors privatised all the major Hungarian pharmaceuticals firms already in the early 1990s, 
except for Gedeon Richter, which is registered on the Budapest Stock Exchange. More 
recently, a number of other foreign pharmaceuticals companies have also set up their 
operation in Hungary as green-field investment. Hence, this sector is dominated by foreign 
professional investors. 
As Gedeon Richter has not been taken over by a foreign professional investor, it is an 
exception on various accounts. It is still pursuing R&D activities to develop its own drugs, 
and thus more recently heavily investing in biotech research facilities. Further, it tries to keep 
its market share in foreign markets on its own, especially in Russia. Thus, the observations 
presented below are not valid for this company. It should be stresses, as Gedeon Richter is 
identified by IRIS as the biggest R&D spender in Hungary: with its €69m R&D spending in 
2008 it is ranked 217 on the list of top 1000 EU firms. (IRIS [2009] 
Foreign ownership has significantly affected the R&D activities and performance of 
Hungarian pharmaceuticals companies. Besides capital injections, foreign investment has also 
facilitated the inflow of modern technologies, and procedures like the in vitro method, as well 
as modern marketing and management techniques. Due to the financial strengths of the parent 
companies, increased R&D funds have become available, and chances for developing a 
product from the original molecule and taking it to the market increased – in the case of firms 
                                               
14 Just to pick a few pieces from the huge body of literature, interested readers are referred to Criscuolo [2009]; 
D'Este [2002]; Gambardella et al. [2000]; Geuna [2001]; Henderson et al. [1999]; Laforgia et al. [2007]; 
Malerba and Orsenigo L [2002]; Mazzucato and Dosi G (eds) [2006]; McKelvey et al. [2004]; Mittra [1997]; 
Nightingale [2000]; Orsenigo et al. [1999]; Orsenigo et al. [2001]; Patel [2008]; Patel et al. [2008]; Scherer 
[1993], [2000], [2007] and. 
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taken over by relatively smaller, family-owned foreign pharmaceuticals companies, pursuing 
this sort of R&D innovation strategy. The allocation of R&D expenditure has become more 
efficient and the exploitation rate of research results increased. As Hungarian companies 
privatised by foreign professional investors have become integrated to the global production 
networks of their parent companies, international co-operation in R&D activities has become 
a daily routine. Further, these companies have gained access to export markets via their 
foreign owners. Given these factors, the competitiveness of Hungarian pharmaceuticals 
companies has improved. (Reiter [2005]) 
The foreign investors have also significantly restructured the R&D units of their Central 
European affiliates. The number of research personnel had decreased – in Hungary from 1629 
in 1998 to 1577 in 2002, and then increased from 1681 in 2003 to 2134 in 2007. (Eurostat) In 
most cases, the global R&D strategy of the parent companies determines what type of 
research is to be performed by their Hungarian affiliates. In many cases, the foreign owners 
reorganised the R&D activities of their Hungarian subsidiaries to improve cost-efficiency at 
the level of the enterprise group (TNC). Hence, R&D at the Hungarian subsidiaries is 
restricted to areas specified in the global R&D strategy, and research aimed at identifying 
original molecules is restricted to only a few specific areas, in a few companies. The number 
of patent applications for original products has, therefore, decreased.15 From a different angle, 
major decisions on R&D and innovation are made by distant headquarters, and the autonomy 
of Hungarian researchers has diminished drastically. Another significant effect is that co-
operation between domestic companies and universities has become more limited, and it is 
performed mainly in the field of developing analytical tests. Finally, the product portfolio of 
Hungarian affiliates has become narrower in many cases, because the parent company has 
replaced Hungarian products by its own drugs.16 
Clinical trials are the most costly, uncertain and time-consuming parts of the process 
leading to a new drug. Interviews suggest that the bulk of R&D funds spent in Hungary by 
foreign firms is financing various stages of clinical trials. The main advantage for them is a 
faster completion of these projects in Hungary. First, patients are more willing to participate 
in clinical trials than in Western countries, because they are less concerned of risks, and have 
stronger incentives to get access to modern, expensive drugs in this way. Thus, required 
samples can be found more quickly. Second, clinics (doctors) are also more interested in this 
type of R&D. They can be involved in advanced projects, obtaining knowledge on exciting 
developments, and generate revenues, too. As for the pharmaceuticals companies, gaining a 
year, or so, is a huge advantage: patent protection is usually granted for 10 years, and clinical 
trials need to be completed in this period. Faster clinical trials, therefore, can be seen as an 
‘extension’ of the temporary monopoly enjoyed by original drugs, leading to notably 
increased revenues. Clinical trials are usually also cheaper in Hungary, but this is of 
secondary importance, compared to faster completion. 
There is no specialisation in terms of diseases – market segments – among the subsidiaries 
of the same TNC. On the contrary, affiliates have to compete for these projects. The main 
selection criteria are the capabilities to obtain an appropriate sample of patients, to “manage” 
the sample in terms of complying with the quality criteria, and to process data at the required 
level. 
                                               
15 Another major explanatory factor is the introduction of product patents – replacing process patents, which had 
been used to circumvent the protection of drugs developed by other companies. Given this transition from the 
process-patent to a product-patent system, Hungarian manufacturers had to introduce a dramatically new 
approach to research. As for the impacts of regulatory changes on R&D activities, see, e.g. Athreye et al. [2009]. 
16 This brief account is based on mini case studies prepared for Havas [2006]. 
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As for the division of labour between the parent firms and subsidiaries concerning the 
clinical trial processes, the overall plan is devised by the headquarters, whereas the study 
design concept, protocols, additional documentation are prepared by the subsidiary in many 
cases. The draft protocol is always co-ordinated with the subsidiary, and on that basis it 
elaborated the final protocol. Analysis and evaluation of results also takes place at the local 
level. Fundamental tasks of the local branch (during before and during implementation) 
include the following: budgeting, dealing with local suppliers, dealing with local regulations 
and permits, contracting (e.g. CROs, doctors, patient groups), data verification, data cleaning, 
etc. It also means that some of the employees of the R&D units of these Hungarian 
pharmaceuticals firms are not trained as researchers (chemists, biologists or medical doctors); 
they can be teachers or middle-managers, who are good enough in performing the tasks listed 
above, or have sufficient skills in data processing. 
Our limited exercise cannot provide an overall estimation on the skills (and tasks) 
composition of the R&D staff of these companies specialising in clinical trials, but this 
observation might be an important consideration from a policy point of view. Obviously, a 
broader coverage would be needed to establish the policy relevance of these facts. 
Several interviews have indicated that in spite of strict regulations, innovations are possible 
and important even for clinical trials. Process and organisational innovations can improve 
efficiency by cutting costs and speeding up various stages of clinical trials. 
One interviewed firm has “merged” the various phases of clinical trials and also reduced the 
number of different “test lines” (e.g. from 5 to 3) in later phases, and hence eliminated 
unnecessary investigations. 
Other examples of process innovations – in most cases developed by competitors and/or in other 
markets by the parent company, but new to the Hungarian firm or even on the local market – 
include: 
 electronic data collection during the clinical trial process 
 application of biomarkers in the experimental phase. 
An innovative way of using clinical trials (not required by regulation) has been introduced 
by another interviewed firm. By comparing two different drugs using the strict protocol of 
clinical trials their aim has been to demonstrate the superiority of their own products, and then 
convince both the health authorities and doctors that it is more effective and efficient to use 
this particular medicine. In brief, clinical trial can be used as a marketing tool, in effect to 
defend market shares when IPR protection would expire, and competitors offering cheaper 
generics would enter. 
As prescription (OCT) drugs cannot be advertised, marketing innovations are crucial tools 
to increase market shares and raise revenues. One of the interviewed companies is particularly 
creative in that respect. They have co-operated very closely with patient groups in organising 
health awareness campaigns concerning various illnesses, for which they offer drugs. 
In this novel way they provide first hand information to the targeted patient group and a 
marketing campaign at the same time. As part of these promotional activities, the involved 
doctors also receive detailed information on the effectiveness of the respective drug. Moreover, 
they have organised free-of-charge screening services in several locations, and thus obtained 
data on tens of thousands of patients. 
These campaigns are perceived as highly useful by patients, doctors and the health authorities. 
E.g. this way they can help in bridging the communication gap between doctors and patients in 
the case of those diseases, which are less known among the population, and hence trust between 
the patients and doctors is key. 
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The first national conference for patient organisations, organised in 2007, was co-sponsored by 
this company, where they also put up information booth, organised screening, etc. These efforts 
were followed up in 2008, when a professional conference was organised, involving officials 
from the Ministry of Health. 
Yet another interviewed company is an exceptional case as it conducts two types of R&D 
activities in Hungary: aimed at developing original drugs and generics, as well. 
These two activities are completely independent of each other (even located in different cities), 
and there is no R&D co-operation between the two Hungarian divisions. The small R&D unit 
working on original drugs collaborates its counterpart at the headquarters of the parent firm. 
These types of R&D activities, however, have been scaled down since 2007, given a strategic 
move of the parent firms, followed by many other drug manufacturers, too. Nowadays these 
companies seek to acquire molecule licences at a later stage of their development from research 
institutes, universities or other labs to reduce uncertainties and related costs. The Hungarian 
subsidiary might also suggest ‘candidate’ molecules, although it is not among its main tasks. 
Strategic decisions regarding the acquisitions of molecules are made by the parent firm. 
Hungarian researchers have improved the quality of a biological drug thanks to a successful 
process innovation, conducted in co-operation with colleagues at the headquarters. There are 2-
3 different methods for manufacturing the required compound. In 2008 a new (more reliable, 
and more stable) method was developed. Since it is a biological drug, the production and the 
certification processes are much more complex than those for small molecule drugs (which can 
be mass produced). For all manufactured “batches” of this drug it has to be documented that all 
batches are equivalent with the one accepted during the registration process. The method that 
proves this equivalence is the innovative part of the new process. Development of such methods 
typically takes 2-3 years, and need to be approved by the relevant authorities. 
A number of further research questions would worth thorough analyses, relying on a 
broader sample, and more detailed firm-level case studies (as opposed to single interviews): 
 a deeper understanding of the differences in R&D and innovation strategies of different 
firms (e.g. the ones privatised by professional investors vs. registered at the stock 
exchange; the ones privatised by large vs. medium-sized foreign professional investors, 
brown-field vs. green-field investments); leading to a taxonomy of firms and their 
strategy, and explaining the links between strategies and performance 
 to what extent path-dependency and cumulativeness is characteristic in this case, where 
sweeping changes have occurred in ownership structures, and a fundamentally new IPR 
system has been introduced in Hungary, while a new science base is emerging in the 
sector in general, leading to new inter-firm and university-industry co-operation patterns 
and a new rationale for mergers and acquisitions 
 the impacts of various non-STI policies on pharmaceuticals R&D activities, the ones by 
narrowly defined economic policies, aimed at cutting (or at least controlling) the 
rocketing health care budget; regulations doctors’ prescribing practice; the overall 
organisational and institutional system of health care and insurance, etc. 
Information and Communication Technologies 
Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) is a commonly used notion to bring 
together several economic sectors, as their products and services rely on these technologies. 
Depending on the purpose of a given analysis, various sectors could be grouped together 
under this heading, usually hardware and software companies, as well as service providers. In 
general, these sectors are regarded as science-based industries or knowledge-intensive 
services. Moreover, several publications of influential international organisations indicate a 
certain level of hype surrounding these sectors/ technologies. Just to highlight a few: “A New 
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Economy? The Changing Role of Innovation and Information Technology in Growth” 
(OECD, 2000), “Drivers of Growth: Information Technology, Innovation and 
Entrepreneurship” (OECD, 2001). These titles are understood by many policy-makers that 
innovation is identical with R&D (or science), and the latter one, in turn, equals high-tech, 
mainly information and communication technologies (ICT). This misconception is reinforced 
by a number of recently introduced indicators and measurement methods, heavily stressing 
the importance of ‘high-tech’, although these indicators and their use are highly 
questionable.17 While the  notion of ‘new economy’ is totally discredited by now, more 
recently the phenomenon of open source software has been extended into a new, general buzz 
word, namely ‘open innovation’, and ‘diffused’ highly successfully in the literature, as well as 
among policy-makers. In sum, ICT has been (mis)used as a launching pad for several hypes 
and myths, or to put it more mildly, dubious notions leading to deceptive policy 
implications.18 
Even a simple look at basic statistics would question the myth about the high-tech nature 
of ICT. The R&D intensity of firms and the same ICT sectors across countries vary greatly. 
Several ICT firms are indeed among the top R&D performers (IRIS [2008], [2009]), while 
many others are ‘screw-driving’ plants, and do not perform any R&D activity. These firm-
level differences are reflected at a sectoral level, too. R&D-intensive industries (or services), 
as classified by the OECD, are not necessarily R&D-intensive ones in all countries. Srholec 
[2006] clearly shows that the actual R&D intensities of the so-called ICT high-tech industries 
were way below the OECD high-tech threshold in 1995-2000 in a large number of OECD 
member states: all the four Central European member states, as well as Denmark, Italy, 
Korea, Mexico, Portugal and Spain. What is even more striking, the R&D intensity of the 
high-tech ICT sectors was below the average R&D intensity of manufacturing industry in the 
four Central European countries. (Figure 4) Thus, it would be a gross mistake to regard these 
sectors as ‘technology leaders’ – with all the assumed positive impacts on growth and 
competitiveness – in these countries. 
                                               
17 On measurement issues, see, e.g. Godin [2004], Smith [2004], as well as a series of working papers at 
http://www.csiic.ca/Pubs_Histoire.html. 
18 Given the promised role of biotechnology, myths are abundant around pharmaceuticals, too. Nightingale and 
Martin [2004] offer a sobering account on these myths. 
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Figure 4: R&D Intensity in Manufacturing in the OECD Countries during 1995-2000 
(BERD on value added in %) 
 
Source: Srholec [2006], based on OECD data 
Note: BERD (Expenditure on R&D in the Business Enterprise Sector) is not available for ISIC 30 in Finland 
in 1998-2000 Japan in both periods, for ISIC 32 in USA in 1995-1997 and for ISIC 33 in Canada and Mexico 
in both periods. 
Case studies also indicate substantial differences among the activities of ICT firms in terms 
of R&D and knowledge-intensity. Even the very same firm at the same plant is likely to 
perform many different activities with diverse levels of R&D intensity.19 When we compare 
plants of a given firms located in different countries, these differences can be even more 
pronounced. The same applies when we consider different firms – although statistically 
belonging to the same sector. 
Indeed, ICT hardware manufacturers can be characterised by a deep, highly structured 
division of labour (e.g. PC manufacturers – chip manufacturers), with the players pursuing 
distinct R&D of innovation strategies. Moreover, the role of the so-called contract 
manufacturers has become dominant (Sturgeon [2002]; Sturgeon and Lee [2001]), and that 
has introduced further elements of complexity in the division of labour, including 
competences of, and responsibilities for, R&D and innovation activities along the value chain. 
If we take the broader spectrum of ICT firms, that is, hardware, software, and service 
provider firms – and also the different types of software and service provider firms inside this 
large group –, a sound analysis should be based on a thorough understanding of an even richer 
diversity in the nature of RTDI processes, and hence firms’ strategies. 
                                               
19 The same observation could be made when using the broader concept of the knowledge content of a given 
activity. 
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This diversity among ICT firms can also be observed in Hungary. Three major telecom 
equipment manufacturing MNCs have Hungarian subsidiaries, all performing R&D and 
production operations (to a different extent, though). Several major contract manufacturing 
MNCs also have plants in Hungary, and a former major indigenous electronics firm (used to 
have its own brand products) has been revived from its ashes by transforming it into a 
contract manufacturer. Besides, lots of small and medium-sized firms are producing ICT 
products and components, developing and distributing software or offering services (e.g. 
consultancy and tailoring software packages to specific needs of government agencies, other 
public bodies and firms). Needles to stress, there are substantial differences among these 
firms in terms of R&D intensity, R&D and innovation strategies and activities, as well as 
patterns of co-operation. 
The limited number of interviews cannot fully reflect this diversity, but some elements can 
be captured by selecting different ‘species’, and new colours can be added to this picture. 
Four firms have been interviewed in these sectors: a subsidiary of a major telecom equipment 
manufacturing MNC; the manufacturing ‘arm’ of a foreign-owned firm specialising in PC-
based scientific instruments; a software developer; and a spin-off firm engaged in developing 
tactile sensor technologies and related software. 
This latter case clearly shows that sectoral characteristics override ownership patterns: 
given the research intensity of the technological fields in which this firm is active, a small, 
domestic firms is not only conducting potentially path-breaking R&D projects, but already are 
in negotiations with the NASA, Boeing, and a major computer game software developer, as 
well as medical equipment manufacturers and surgical teams abroad. 
The software developer, established 25 years ago, is serving a special market segment: it 
supports technical professionals with a bespoke package. They are active both in product and 
marketing innovations. 
Their flagship product is being continuously developed, and major upgrades are released 
regularly, in every 12-18 months. These different versions represent different type of product 
innovations. E.g. the version released in 2008 has been tailored for multi-processor workstations 
to increase performance. (As of autumn 2009 this was the only software package in this market 
segment with this feature.) This type of innovation is ‘under the skin’ for the users, while other 
types of upgrades can be termed ‘functional innovations’. A major improvement of this kind 
was patented in 2007: the so-called virtual trace function provides a tool to create 3D 
documentation from the 2D ‘layers’. Engineers used to work on paper, in 2D. To create 3D 
views, they applied transparent paper, placing several layers of these 2D design sheets on each 
other. Now they directly feel this new function – as opposed to the other, ‘under the skin’ 
technical improvements –, and would certainly appreciate it. A more recent development is in 
between ‘pure technical enhancement’ and ‘functional’ innovations. The latest version of their 
product supports team work by introducing a server-based database (instead of files), offering 
more reliable and secure, faster and more flexible access to data for those engineers who work 
in a team on a large(r) design project. (Around 20-30% of their customers work for large 
companies, where team work is more likely than at SMEs.) 
Marketing innovations are also crucial to maintain their competitiveness. A new business model 
was introduced in certain markets in 2001: customers may choose ‘subscription to permanent 
support’, as opposed to buying the new versions of the product. In this new model the customer 
enters in to a long-term service agreement with company, paying an annual fee for continuous 
support services (consultancy, maintenance, etc.), and receiving the latest (usually yearly) 
upgrades of the software package. In this way revenues can be planned more reliably, and thus 
the financial conditions for product development are becoming more stable. (The basics of this 
business model had been first introduced just 3-4 years before this company.) 
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A combination of marketing and organisational innovations is the use of two main sales models. 
As around 99.5% of revenues are stemming from the export markets, finding the right sales 
methods and channels is of crucial importance. In several countries local subsidiaries are 
responsible for sales activities in their respective markets, with sales being their exclusive task. 
In other countries the company contracts local, individual distributor agents. To some extent 
even these independent sales agent influence product development by providing regular and 
systematic feedback from the users. These are important inputs, as local design routines – or 
other context- and culture-specific features – need to be taken into account during the product 
development process. All in all, the company works with dedicated distributors in 80 countries 
and hundreds of Value-Added Resellers (VARs) and Systems Integrators who provide 
personalised consultancy services to customers. 
One of the major lessons gained from the interview with a subsidiary of a major telecom 
equipment manufacturing MNC is that substantial R&D activities (in terms of financial and 
human resources) could be ‘decoupled’ from other local activities (production, sales), as the 
former ones are serving either strategic R&D objectives or actual product development 
projects defined at the group level. (see also sub-section 4.3.2) Hence, it would be misleading 
to quantify the impacts of R&D activities on productivity or profits at the level of this 
subsidiary. The relevant unit of analysis is the group itself. (Other lessons are utilised in sub-
sections 4.3.3 and 4.3.5.) 
The manufacturing ‘arm’ of a foreign-owned firm specialising in PC-based scientific 
instruments had originally been meant as a pure manufacturing plant in a low-cost production 
base. Then gradually several R&D, engineering and innovation activities have evolved fairly 
quickly: first to support production processes, then upgrade/ modify existing products (e.g. 
the replacement of several components to make lead-free soldering possible), and finally to 
enhance the efficiency of testing – a crucial act in this business – by designing new, modular 
test racks, capable of testing a much wider variety of instruments, and thus speeding up 
production (the line need not to b e stopped for changing the test rack). Further R&D 
activities are also planned to be conducted, and thus the number engineers employed for these 
tasks might increase from the current 20 to 30-40 in a few years. 
As another type of innovation, this firm has also applied the basic principles of lean 
manufacturing to cut costs, and as an element of these changes, U-shape manufacturing has 
been introduced. In this way, the number of personnel engaged in certain production 
processes has been reduced. Yet, these people have not been laid off, because training them is 
time-consuming and costly. Hence, they have been given new tasks. 
 
4.3.2 A refined taxonomy of the role of RTDI activities in the overall business strategy of 
foreign-owned firms 
A growing number of major foreign companies have expanded their existing R&D units or set 
up new ones in Hungary since the mid-1990s. Earlier research has suggested that for 
analytical purposes and from the point of view of policy relevance four types of strategies can 
be distinguished concerning the role and ‘weight’ of RTDI activities in the overall business 
models of foreign-owned firms. The impacts of these distinct strategies on the national 
innovation system of host country, and in particular on the indigenous firms’ RTDI activities 
and learning capabilities would be different. (Havas [2004]) 
Interviews conducted for the Micro-Dyn project have confirmed this tentative taxonomy, 
but a fifth type of strategy has also been identified. Several foreign-owned firms have set up 
R&D units in Hungary, and also performs production activities, but these are ‘disjoint’: R&D 
activities are mainly conducted as parts of group-level R&D projects, serving the global 
market, and practically have no connection to other activities serving the domestic market. 
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Taking into account this Micro-Dyn finding, a revised taxonomy can be summarised as 
follows: 
1) Narrowly defined efficiency and/ or market seeking FDI with no R&D conducted in 
the host country 
In these cases product innovations are underpinned by R&D activities conducted at 
other sites – often in the home country – of the investor. Process innovations would 
also rely on the experience accumulated at other sites, but in the case of brown-field 
investments domestic skills and knowledge might play a role. As for organisational, 
management and marketing innovations, the main source would be again the codified 
and tacit knowledge of the foreign managers. These innovation efforts would enhance 
the productivity of a given site, but hardly any impact can be expected on the other 
players of the domestic NIS, except for spillover effects, proper.20 
2) R&D ‘contracted out’ by the headquarters (without having domestic production 
activities) 
These units conduct R&D projects to cut costs, compensate for the lack of researchers 
in the home country, or seek other advantages (e.g. faster clinical trials). They are, 
however, stand alone entities, and in most cases not linked to local R&D institutes or 
indigenous firms. These units, therefore, have an almost negligible impact on the 
national innovation system. An important exception is when small Hungarian R&D 
units of foreign-owned pharmaceuticals firms organise clinical trials: by definition, 
they must co-operate with local clinics, and in several cases they also co-operated with 
CROs (contract research organisations). 
3) ‘Disjoint’ domestic production and R&D 
These units also conduct R&D projects to cut costs, compensate for the lack of 
researchers in the home country, or seek other advantages. These R&D activities are, 
however, not linked to local production activities. Collaboration with other local R&D 
institutes or university departments can be observed, as opposed to Type 2) strategies. 
These units, therefore, might have some noticeable impacts on the national innovation 
system (e.g. via shaping curricula, offering professional and financial support fro PhD 
programmes). 
4) R&D activities to underpin local manufacturing or service activities 
Some of these R&D units work exclusively on intra-mural projects, relying on internal 
knowledge (possessed by the parent firm, developed either in the host or home country 
or at other sites). Others co-operate with local universities or R&D institutes to exploit 
external knowledge sources. Obviously, the former ones have not affect on the 
domestic NIS, while the latter ones contribute to joint knowledge generation and 
exploitation processes.  
5) Deep integration: RTDI efforts for both local and global projects 
These firms – and their R&D units – are engaged in both local and global RTDI 
efforts and thus have close links with the local knowledge bases, too, bringing them 
into their international networks. This group is smaller in number than ‘type 3’ R&D 
units, and hence their impacts on the NIS should not be exaggerated. Yet, it should not 
be underestimated, either: their behavioural norms, management methods and the 
overall mode of operation can have important ‘demonstration effects’ through their 
interaction with the local players, and lead to ‘learning by co-operation’. 
                                               
20 On the complexity of spillover issues, see, e.g. Breschi and Lissoni [2001] and Langlois and Robertson [1996]. 
Empirical analyses usually follow a different approach, e.g. Damijan et al. [2003]. 
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4.3.3 Academia-industry collaboration 
Interviews have confirmed that companies and public R&D units (PROs) are driven by 
fundamentally different incentives to be involved R&D and innovation activities. Hence, 
there are inherent hindrances to academia-industry collaboration – one of the weak points of 
the Hungarian NIS, as already discussed in Section 3. In brief, companies are interested in a 
relatively wide array of R&D activities (from day-to-day problem solving to long-term 
strategic research), but those lead to business results (enhanced productivity, larger market 
shares, entry to new markets, increased profits). Thus, tight project management (e.g. meeting 
deadlines and ‘respecting’ budget constraints) and keeping commercially sensible information 
secret are of vital importance. In contrast, researchers working for universities and other 
publicly financed research units are not only interested, but even forced to disclose their 
results. Further, they are less accustomed to tight project management. 
Certain types of co-operation have been observed, however. Any research-intensive spin-
off firms would naturally co-operate closely with those research units where founders used to 
work (or still keep a part-time position). Yet, the only firm in our sample has indicated certain 
frictions in co-operation, given the rigid structures and slow decision-making at the public 
research institutes. 
Almost all medium-sized interviewed firms reported R&D co-operation with universities 
and/or PROs, especially with those located nearby. In all these cases there has been a 
pragmatic technical objective – a certain problem to be solved, a new production process to be 
introduced, etc. –, and a public support measure has also been exploited. (Several Hungarian 
STI policy measures either make academia-industry co-operation compulsory, or this type of 
project proposals are given priority.) 
Larger firms tend to be more interested in co-operating with universities and PROs on 
strategic, long-term R&D projects to explore new technological opportunities, reducing both 
the costs and risks by co-operation. They also support PhD courses financially and/or offering 
PhD students relevant themes (projects) for their thesis. (A broader form of co-operation is 
supporting tertiary training by donating modern equipment to universities, and hence making 
sure that the next generation of engineers and scientists would be familiar e.g. with up-to-date 
measurement techniques and other relevant instruments.) 
In sum, different firms are faced with different needs, and thus pursue different RTDI 
strategies. Hence, different forms and types of academia-industry co-operation can be 
observed, with specific goals and activities. STI policies, however, tend to neglect this 
diversity. 
4.3.4 The role of users in innovation 
Interviews have also given detailed insights on the decisive role played by users in innovation 
processes in certain industries (specific software packages, hand tools). This is a thoroughly 
researched topic, and the findings of these M-D interviews are in line of the literature (see e.g. 
the works of von Hippel). 
4.3.5 The use and impacts of domestic and EU STI policy measures 
Interviews suggest a surprisingly low importance of domestic and EU STI policy measures – 
but a caveat is in place immediately: this is a very small, non-representative sample. Several 
firms, however, have exploited grants offered by these schemes. Practically all cases the 
project had already been decided; i.e. the scheme in question has not oriented the RTDI 
activities of a given firm. Moreover, most of these projects would have been conducted 
without public support, too. On other words, additionality in the narrow sense has been fairly 
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low. More detailed case studies would be needed to establish if additionality in the broader 
sense – the so-called behavioural additionality – has occurred in any of these cases. (Lipsey 
and Carlaw [1998]; OECD [2006]) 
It should be also stressed that consultancy firms specialising in identifying opportunities to 
obtain public support and drafting project proposals have played a major role in several cases. 
Without them a number of firms have not applied for public support. Again, more thorough 
research, relying on a larger sample, would be needed to draw firm policy conclusions. So far, 
only diametrically opposite interpretations can be put forward as hypotheses. A) These firms 
play a useful role in ‘re-wiring’ and revitalising the Hungarian NIS: they disseminate vital 
information and build contacts among the interested players more efficiently than the 
responsible government agencies and other public (non-profit) organisations charged with 
these tasks. B) These firms pursue a special rent-seeking strategy, and appropriate some 10-
15% of public funds meant to be used for advancing societally good courses. 
 
4.3.6 Impacts of the global crisis 
Our limited sample has suggested significant differences across sectors concerning the 
impacts of the global financial and economic crisis. Some sectors have been hit particularly 
hard, e.g. automotive firms, while others have been ‘sheltered’, given fundamentally different 
nature of their markets, most notably pharmaceuticals. 
More importantly, there has been marked differences in terms of the importance of 
innovation as a response to the crisis (e.g. devoting more resources to R&D in order to speed 
up the introduction of new products, cutting costs by process innovations) inside a given 
sector (ICT). 
 
5 IMPLICATIONS 
Even this small sample offer several methodological and policy implications, which are 
highlighted below. 
5.1 Implications for innovation surveys 
Some standard questions of innovation surveys might need some revision or more detailed 
interpretation in ‘fast-moving’ sectors (e.g. when the main product is changed every year or 
products tend to have a 3-year life time). In these sectors practically all firms would be 
innovative (‘innovation-active’) using the definition of the Community Innovation Survey 
(CIS). Obviously, a more refined terminology would be required to underpin theoretically 
relevant analyses, which in turn can be’ translated’ into sensible policy conclusions. 
Interviews have also showed that managers have different understanding of innovation 
(being innovative). In almost all cases it has been crucial to explain the CIS definition in 
detail: otherwise they would have declared their firm non-innovative. Hence, it would be 
useful to run a specific project to check the ‘validity’ and quality of CIS results. How those 
managers understand/ interpret innovation who reply to CIS questionnaires on their own, 
relying on only the written definition. Given this question, this project can only be based on 
face-to face interviews, and thus would be rather costly. Yet, the opportunity cost – devising 
policy measures based on false information – is likely to exceed these costs significantly. One 
more caveat: there might be major differences in this respect across countries (more 
developed ones, in general, and having accumulated more experience with running CIS and 
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analysing its results vs. less developed ones and/ or less experienced ones), as well as among 
firms (with different level of R&D and innovation intensity, and/ or managerial skills). 
 
5.2 Implications for quantitative analyses 
In case of ‘disjoint’ R&D and production (when there is no link between R&D efforts 
conducted in the host country and the subsidiary’s economic performance) the unit of analysis 
cannot be the local subsidiary. It would be important to establish to what extent this 
phenomenon would influence (‘distort’) the results of econometric analyses. 
Interviews have also revealed that in some cases R&D is conducted in Hungary, but 
financed directly by the parent firm (e.g. some clinical trials). These activities simply cannot 
be analysed by using census and R&D survey data. Again, it would be useful to know to what 
extent this phenomenon would influence (‘distort’) the results of econometric analyses. 
 
5.3 Implications for policy analyses and policy actions 
Interviews have also raised several questions for further research: 
 What room is left for policies when FDI plays a dominant role in the host economy? 
 How, why and to what extent to promote “disjoint” R&D activities, conducted for 
MNCs? Guided by what policy rationale? To what extent is it beneficial for the public? 
 As for academia-industry collaboration, a strong need has emerged for more refined 
measures, better tuned to the needs of the actors (based on a relevant taxonomy of 
academia-industry collaboration). 
Further, evaluation criteria for academics should also be revised to remove some major 
obstacles, currently blocking more effective academia-industry co-operation. Obviously, 
it would require sound analyses and then thorough decision-preparatory process because 
quite naturally a fierce opposition is likely from academics, given strong traditions at 
universities and PROs. (Academic freedom is even ‘carved in stones’ in Hungary: it is a 
constitutional right – and already has been used as a powerful weapon to deny reforms in 
the higher education sector.) 
 Spin-off companies are faced with several important challenges in Hungary, including 
heavy regulatory and tax burdens, difficulties in receiving external funding, operating 
under the ownership of universities or PROs with a different – not business friendly – 
management culture, the complicated, cumbersome nature of public R&D support 
measures. How to remove these obstacles – but also avoiding the hypes of venture capital 
and new technology based firms? 
Finally, an important policy lesson can be drawn from the discussion on the so-called high-
tech sectors vs. knowledge-intensive activities. STI policies aimed at promoting innovation 
and hence competitiveness should focus on the actual activities performed, rather than 
confusing them with the OECD classification of sectors. More precisely, four levels should be 
distinguished: activities, products, firms and sectors. Firms belonging to the same statistical 
sector might possess quite different capabilities, e.g. innovation, production, management, 
marketing and financial ones. Further, they are unlikely to produce identical goods, e.g. in 
terms of skills and investment requirement, quality, market and profit opportunities. Finally, 
they perform different activities, especially in their knowledge-intensity. These dissimilarities 
are likely to be even more pronounced when we analyse sectors, firms, products and activities 
across different national systems of innovation and production. In short, the performance of 
heterogeneous firms cannot be improved by uniform policy approaches. No doubts, it sounds 
 33 
elementary; yet policy-makers tend to prefer ‘broad’, general policy tools: they are less 
willing to pay attention to the above crucial differences among firms in the same statistical 
sector, and thus even less ready to devise and operate differentiated schemes. 
Even highly respected scholars could make this mistake, as pointed out by Archibugi 
[2001], when commenting on Pavitt’s classic taxonomy of innovating firms: “… the 
taxonomy is devoted to classifying firms and not industries (…). Unfortunately, Pavitt himself 
has failed to make this aspect clear: in his 1984 article, as well as in his further developments, 
Pavitt has grouped in each category of his taxonomy data at the industry and not at the firm 
level. This is a major limitation since it is well known that firms which have for convenience 
been grouped together into an industry on the basis of their main output may have a very 
different technological base: both slippers and moon-boots belong to the footwear industry, 
but the technology-intensity of the two products is very different (…).” (p. 419). This 
example should not be dismissed as a witty, but extreme, and thus irrelevant remark. Indeed, 
the author also shows that this seemingly small, unimportant mistake may “… lead to wrong 
policy advice; suppose that a government (…) makes an attempt to foster innovation by using 
different incentives for each group of firms. If selectivity criteria are applied on the basis of 
industry to which a firm belongs it is likely that a substantial part of incentives to innovation 
will be misplaced: for example, moon-boot manufacturers may receive incentives to purchase 
specialised machinery [as follows from Pavitt’s taxonomy for footwear companies – A.H.] 
rather than to finance their in-house R&D.” (p. 420) 
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